Received 10.10.2022
Revised 02.01.2023
Accepted 30.01.2023
Retrieved from Vol. 13, No. 1, 2023
Pages 178 -197
Abstract
Although imagination abnormalities are frequent and handicapping in schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSDs), psychopathology lacks a conceptual framework for modeling imagination disorders. Recently, in connection with the “imaginary turn” in phenomenology, translational approaches between philosophy and psychopathology have been sought. The purpose of the article is the presentation and analysis of modern foreign phenomenological studies of imagination in SSDs by a group of researchers headed by A. Rasmussen and J. Parnas, for the possible implementation of the results in domestic practice. The author first examines the features of anomalous fantasy and imagination in SSDs from the phenomenological point of view and then presents an overview of the EAFI instrument for a semistructured, phenomenological study of anomalous fantasy and imagination through interviews. Then the author analyzes the theoretical and practical implications of such research for understanding psychotherapeutic processes and recovery strategies. The studied disorders of imagination are characterized by three phenomenological dimensions: 1) perceptualization of imagery: the experience acquires certain quasi-perceptual qualities, such as spatialization, spatiotemporal constancy and explorabilty; 2) autonomization of imagery with a quasi-involuntary flow and a sense of empirical distance between the conscious image and the sense of agency; and 3) erosion of irreality: whereas the imagination is normally lived with an ever-present character of unreality, people with SSDs can experience vivid imagery without a clear separation with the real world. Rasmussen et al. not only describe clinical experience, they also offer a conceptual model of imagination disorders as expressions of minimal self-disorders (disorders of ipseity). The researchers hypothesize that impaired ipseity itself is the core generative disorder of schizophrenia, and positive/negative symptoms derive from this core phenotype. Thus, imagination is understood as a mental domain that affects the underlying disorder, meaning that imagination has the same status as all other modes of intentional consciousness (such as perception or memory). T. Gozé and I. Fazakas go further and suggest a phenomenological distinction between fantasy and imagination, which resembles the distinction between body schema and body image
Keywords:
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